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Abstract 
 
Until the late nineteenth century, the British alkali industry enjoyed a colossal export market in the 
United States. Yet, as several scholars have already noted, the highly protectionist Dingley Tariff of 
1897 caused a precipitous and irreversible decline in the volume of British alkali exports to the United 
States. Drawing upon an abundance of textual evidence, this study argues that, in addition to the 
climactic Dingley Tariff, previous American tariff acts in 1883, 1890, and 1894 also exerted a 
pronounced influence on the volume of British alkali exports to the United States. Further 
corroborating this claim is a regression analysis that employs, as an explanatory variable, newly 
constructed annual estimates of the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed upon 
alkali imports from Britain. 
 
Approaching the British alkali industry from a microeconomic standpoint, this study also argues that 
one particular British alkali firm, Brunner, Mond & Co., mitigated its financial exposure to American 
tariff policy by acquiring, in 1887, a minority shareholding in a nascent American alkali firm, the 
Solvay Process Company. Profits from Brunner’s shareholding in the Solvay Process Company 
substantially offset the profits that Brunner, Mond & Co. lost as the result of its diminished alkali 
exports to the United States. The other dominant British alkali firm, the United Alkali Company, did 
not fare so well. 
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 1 
Introduction 
  The British alkali industry of the late nineteenth century relied heavily upon the 
export market, with the leading foreign consumer of British alkali being the United 
States. In fact, during the early 1890s, the American market accounted for no less than 
an astonishing three-fifths of British alkali exports.1 Yet, following the passage of the 
highly protectionist Dingley Tariff (1897), British alkali exports to the United States 
diminished so precipitously that, by the early 1900s, all but the most optimistic 
observers acknowledged that the British alkali industry had lost the American market 
irretrievably.2 
 Admittedly, the Dingley Tariff was not the first piece of American legislation to 
revise the specific tariffs imposed upon the various classes of alkali imported into the 
United States.3 The Mongrel Tariff (1883), McKinley Tariff (1890), and Wilson-
Gorman Tariff (1894) were each products of the ongoing political Sturm und Drang 
surrounding the great tariff question of whether the United States ought to gravitate 
more toward protectionism or free trade. These three acts altered the specific tariff on at 
least one class of alkali. The American tariff acts of this period typically enumerated 
five broad classes of alkali: bicarbonate soda, caustic soda, sal soda, soda ash, and soda 
crystals, each of which served a different industrial purpose, or in the case of 
bicarbonate soda, a household purpose. 
 Scholars have repeatedly noted the connection between the Dingley Tariff and 
the abrupt decline in British alkali exports to the United States. Nonetheless, preceding 
                                                 
1 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Annual Statement of the Trade of the United 
Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, various years).  
2 Cheshire Record Office (CRO), DIC UA 3/7, Reports of Proceedings at General 
Meetings, 1891-1925. 
3 Whereas a specific tariff levies a fixed duty per quantity of good imported, an ad 
valorem tariff levies a duty calculated as a percent of the value of the good imported. In the late 
nineteenth century, the United States imposed specific tariffs on each of the classes of alkali 
imported.   
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tariff legislation also revised the specific tariffs imposed on the five classes of alkali; the 
effect of these earlier tariff acts on British alkali exports has remained hitherto 
unexamined by the academic community. Accordingly, the first line of inquiry of this 
study assesses whether American tariff policy impacted the volume of British alkali 
exports to its single largest foreign market, the United States, during the period from 
1880 to 1905, a span of time covering the passage and aftermath of four tariff acts, 
including the momentous Dingley Tariff. In this first part of the study, the methodology 
entails constructing annual estimates of the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United 
States imposed upon the collective basket of alkali imports from Britain. The ad 
valorem equivalent tariff then serves as an explanatory variable, alongside several 
control variables, in a time-series regression against a dependent variable of British 
alkali exports to the United States. Here, the objective is to determine if the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff on British alkali is a statistically significant explanatory variable.  
 One of the most salient features of the British alkali industry during the late 
nineteenth century was the oligopolistic control that two firms, the United Alkali 
Company (UAC) and Brunner, Mond & Co. exerted over it. Formed in 1890, the UAC 
merged forty-five firms that produced alkali using the increasingly obsolescent Leblanc 
process, in an effort to preserve the commercial viability of these Leblanc 
manufacturers by reducing the costs of administration and distribution.4 Indeed, the 
formation of the UAC was a reaction to the growth of the highly profitable Brunner, 
Mond during the 1880s.5 Brunner, Mond produced alkali using the newer and cheaper 
ammonia-soda process, known less technically as the Solvay process.  
                                                 
4 L. F. Haber, The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1958), 182. 
5 For the annual profits of Brunner, Mond, see W. J. Reader, The Forerunners, 1870-
1926, vol. 1 of Imperial Chemical Industries: A History (London: Oxford University Press, 
1970), 513. 
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 While discrepant processes (Leblanc and ammonia-soda) constituted perhaps the 
most obvious difference between the two firms, there were other essential differences, 
as well. In 1887, Brunner, Mond began to acquire a minority shareholding in a fledgling 
American alkali manufacturer, the Solvay Process Company (SPC) of Syracuse, New 
York, with the intention of maintaining a certain degree of access to the American 
market and, more importantly, to the profits ensuing there from.6 This strategy proved 
farsighted when, a decade later, the Dingley Tariff raised the specific tariffs on the 
various classes of alkali, especially soda ash, to a level that afforded the SPC sufficient 
protection to capture much of the American market. From a profitability standpoint, 
Brunner, Mond presumably mitigated its losses by investing in a firm protected behind 
a tariff wall. Thus, the second line of inquiry of this study considers the extent to which 
Brunner’s partial ownership in the SPC limited the former firm’s financial exposure to 
the American tariff on alkali. The methodology in this second part of the study involves 
calculating the volume of Brunner’s American alkali market, or more precisely, the 
volume of the American market upon which Brunner, Mond laid claim to the profits: 
the sum of a) Brunner’s annual alkali exports to the United States and b) the SPC’s 
annual alkali sales in the United States multiplied by Brunner’s share of ownership in 
the SPC. The volume of Brunner’s American alkali market then serves as the dependent 
variable in a log-log regression aimed, ultimately, at determining how much Brunner, 
Mond reduced its financial exposure to American tariff policy by making a foreign 
portfolio investment in the SPC. 
 This study does not intend to present two disparate lines of inquiry, but rather to 
examine holistically the relationship between American tariff policy and the British 
                                                 
6 Kenneth Bertrams, Nicolas Coupain, and Ernst Homburg, Solvay: History of a 
Multinational Family Firm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 49. 
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alkali industry from complementary macroeconomic and microeconomic vantage 
points. The first area of inquiry, the macroeconomic, poses the question of whether 
American tariff policy affected British alkali exports to the United States during the 
period from 1880 to 1905, a span of time covering the passage and aftermath of four 
tariff acts. The second area of inquiry, the microeconomic, poses the question of 
whether a foreign portfolio investment in the SPC enabled Brunner, Mond to mitigate, 
in any appreciable way, its financial exposure to American tariff policy. In attempting 
to answer the two questions, this dissertation does not limit itself to quantitative 
analysis alone, but instead relies equally upon a profusion of rich textual evidence from 
both sides of the Atlantic. Through a balanced quantitative and qualitative approach, 
this study reaches conclusions that represent novel contributions to the rather cursory 
literature on the relationship between American tariff policy and the British alkali 
industry, which is discussed in the next section. 
  
Literature Review 
 The consensus among economic historians, including this author, is that the 
Dingley Tariff effectively ended British alkali exports to the United States. However, 
the scholarly literature on the British alkali industry during the late nineteenth century 
makes only occasional reference to American tariff policy prior to the Dingley Tariff. In 
The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century (1958), L. F. Haber points out 
that the Wilson-Gorman Tariff prompted a temporary increase in British alkali exports 
to the United States by reducing the specific tariffs on bicarbonate and caustic soda.7 
For both of these classes of alkali, the Wilson-Gorman Tariff revised the duties 
                                                 
7 Haber, 216.  
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downward from 1¢ to 0.5¢ per pound.8 The Mongrel Tariff and McKinley Tariff also 
lowered the duties on several classes of alkali, but these tariff acts garner even less 
attention in the extant literature. In fact, despite the Mongrel Tariff having lowered the 
duty on caustic soda from 1.5¢ to 1¢ per pound, there is not a single reference to this 
tariff act in any of the secondary source material on the British alkali industry.9 
Altogether, the scholarly literature lacks a comprehensive treatment of American tariff 
policy toward alkali imports, which were almost exclusively from Britain.  
 Compared to the American tariff on alkali, more has been written about 
Brunner’s minority shareholding in the SPC. W. J. Reader provides an account of this 
investment in the first volume of Imperial Chemical Industries: A History (1970). He 
writes, “From 1887 onwards, by a series of agreements, Brunner, Mond handed over 
their American trade to SPC, relying for their American profits in future on their 
shareholding and not on export from Winnington.”10 Reader describes how the growth 
of the SPC represented an incursion into Brunner’s American market, and how Brunner, 
Mond therefore brokered an agreement with the SPC in 1887: Brunner, Mond was 
allowed to purchase 2,000 non-voting shares in the SPC, and the SPC was guaranteed, 
until 1892, four-ninths of the portion of the American alkali market jointly supplied by 
the two firms.11 He then argues that Brunner’s partial ownership in the SPC curtailed 
the former firm’s financial losses in the wake of the Dingley Tariff, which had the effect 
of almost completely barring Brunner, Mond and the UAC from the American market.12  
                                                 
8 United States, House of Representatives, Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress of the 
United States from 1789 to 1909, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., 1909, H. Doc 671, 469. This tariff act 
also lowered the duties on sal soda and soda crystals from 0.25¢ to 0.125¢. 
9 Ibid., 321. 
10 Reader, 64. 
11 Ibid., 98-100. In 1886, Brunner, Mond and the SPC together supplied slightly more 
than half of the American alkali market.  
12 Ibid., 174. 
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 In The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 (1989), Mira 
Wilkins corroborates Reader’s description of how Brunner, Mond swapped guaranteed 
access to the American alkali market in exchange for profits from the SPC.13 She then 
evaluates the quality of the SPC as an investment, boldly stating that the SPC was “by 
far the largest and most successful of all the foreign investments in [American] heavy 
chemicals.”14 However, Wilkins does not address whether the SPC, as an investment, 
was successful enough to fully compensate Brunner, Mond for financial losses resulting 
from the Dingley Tariff. 
 Kenneth Bertrams, Nicolaus Coupain, and Ernst Homburg, the authors of 
Solvay: History of a Multinational Family Firm (2013), do not regard Brunner’s 
minority shareholding in the SPC as a saving grace in the face of the Dingley Tariff, at 
least not in the same way that Reader does. Moreover, these authors portray Brunner, 
Mond and the SPC as natural competitors only reluctantly collaborating with each 
other. On this note, Bertrams et al. point to the inevitable tension between the firms; the 
SPC wanted to expand its share of the American alkali market, which Brunner, Mond 
was loath to relinquish.15 The authors provide a more numerical analysis than do Reader 
and Wilkins. One number of particular importance is the share of Brunner’s minority 
ownership in the SPC, which the authors determine to be 16.7 percent in 1887.16 
 Neither Reader, Wilkins, nor Bertrams et al. offer any quantification of the 
extent to which Brunner’s minority shareholding in the SPC mitigated Brunner’s 
financial exposure to the American tariff on alkali. Reader casually claims that this 
investment assuaged the impact of the Dingley Tariff on the profitability of Brunner, 
                                                 
13 Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), 404-405. 
14 Ibid., 410. 
15 Bertrams, 50. 
16 Ibid., 49. 
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Mond. Yet, the impreciseness of this claim invites a range of interpretations; the profits 
from Brunner’s minority shareholding could have constituted a paltry sum or, 
alternatively, a full compensation for the financial losses resulting from the Dingley 
Tariff. The impreciseness of Reader’s claim leaves a scholarly gap that this study fills. 
Furthermore, in keeping with the first line of inquiry, this study explores the extent to 
which Brunner’s partial ownership in the SPC limited the former firm’s financial 
exposure to the American tariff on alkali throughout the late nineteenth century, and not 
just Brunner’s exposure to the Dingley Tariff alone.17 
 The relationship between American tariff policy and the British alkali industry 
in the late nineteenth century is germane to several extra-alkali clusters of literature in 
the field of economic history. The findings of this dissertation carry implications for 
two scholarly arguments, in particular. The first argument is articulated by Stephen N. 
Broadberry in “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain? A Sectoral 
Analysis of Comparative Productivity Levels, 1870-1990” (1998). The second 
argument is laid forth by Charles Feinstein in “Exports and British Economic Growth 
(1850-1914)” (1996). To be sure, this dissertation is worthwhile partly because of its 
potential to converse with the two aforementioned writings.   
 Broadberry tackles the immense question of how American (and German) 
aggregate labor productivity surpassed British aggregate labor productivity. He points 
out that, after 1870, the ratio of American manufacturing labor productivity to British 
manufacturing labor productivity remained fairly consistent at two-to-one.18 Therefore, 
the American lead in aggregate labor productivity did not derive from any further 
                                                 
17 Since Brunner, Mond only acquired its minority shareholding in the SPC in 1887, the 
Mongrel Tariff cannot be considered here. 
18 Stephen N. Broadberry, “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain? 
A Sectoral Analysis of Comparative Productivity Levels, 1870-1990,” Journal of Economic 
History 58, no. 2 (June 1998): 380. 
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widening of the gap between American and British manufacturing labor productivity. 
Instead, the American lead in aggregate labor productivity derived, in part, from the 
population and resources of the United States shifting out of agriculture and into 
manufacturing.19 In so doing, the United States reallocated resources to a sector of the 
economy that enjoyed a substantial, though stable, labor productivity lead over Britain. 
But what were the mechanics of the shift out of agriculture and into manufacturing, 
including alkali manufacturing? To what degree did American tariff policy accelerate 
the shift? In response to the latter question, this dissertation might rightly constitute a 
sort of case study. Though this dissertation does not endeavor to address the same 
questions that Broadberry does, it nevertheless elaborates upon an aspect of his 
argument: the United States shifting population and resources into manufacturing, in 
this case the manufacturing of alkali.  
 Feinstein reassesses the so-called traditional hypothesis that the diminishing 
growth rate of British exports in the late nineteenth century inhibited the overall 
economic growth of Britain. Feinstein points out that, whereas total British exports 
grew at an average rate of 3.5 percent per annum between 1856 and 1873, this rate 
dropped to 2.6 percent per annum between 1873 and 1913.20 Likewise, moving from the 
earlier to the later interval, the growth rate of total British industrial output fell from 2.9 
to 2.0 percent per annum.21 The parallel decline in the growth rates of exports and 
industrial output underpins the traditional hypothesis of “export-retarded growth,” as 
Feinstein refers to it.22  
                                                 
19 Ibid., 383. The other factor that drove American aggregate labor productivity to 
surpass British aggregate labor productivity was the United States improving its relative labor 
productivity in services. 
20 Charles Feinstein, “Exports and British Economic Growth (1850-1914),” in 
International Trade and British Economic Growth from the Eighteenth Century to the Present 
Day, ed. Peter Mathias and John A. Davis (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 78. 
21 Ibid., 77. 
22 Ibid., 78. 
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 Feinstein identifies four propositions that must hold true, in order to affirm the 
traditional hypothesis of export-retarded growth. The first two propositions resonate 
most closely with this dissertation. The first proposition is “that the changes which 
initiated this deceleration in export growth rates had their origin in the process of 
foreign industrialization, and were essentially independent of developments within 
Britain.”23 The second proposition is “that the dominant effect of the extension of this 
industrialization to other countries was increased competition for Britain, and a resultant 
loss of markets.”24 At the level of the whole British economy, Feinstein determines that 
the historical evidence supports these two propositions. However, at the level of 
individual British industries, these two propositions need not always hold true, or might 
hold true for a period other than late-Victorian Britain. Feinstein openly acknowledges 
that foreign industrialization and the consequent decline of British exports occurred to 
varying extents depending upon the particular industry, with the steel industry 
experiencing especially rapid development in foreign countries.25 This dissertation 
sheds light on whether Feinstein’s two propositions hold true for a particular industry: 
the British alkali industry, which was hardly a trivial component of the British economy 
in the late nineteenth century. In reference to the first proposition, the analysis in this 
dissertation collaterally answers the question: was there the exogenous development of 
an alkali industry in the United States? In reference to the second proposition, the 
analysis in this dissertation also answers the question: did the development of an 
American alkali industry result in the decline of British alkali exports to the United 
States? By answering these questions, this dissertation assesses whether or not the 
British alkali industry conformed to the traditional hypothesis of export-retarded 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 80-81. 
24 Ibid., 81. 
25 Ibid., 88. 
 10 
growth, Feinstein’s third and fourth propositions notwithstanding. The dissertation 
returns to Feinstein’s and Broadberry’s arguments in the conclusion section. 
 
 Estimating the Ad Valorem Equivalent Tariff 
The procedure for constructing annual estimates of the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff that the United States imposed upon the collective basket of alkali imports from 
Britain involves three steps. First, for every one of the twenty-six years between 
1879/80 and 1904/05, the volume of each class of alkali (bicarbonate soda, caustic soda, 
sal soda, soda ash, and soda crystals) that the United States imported from Britain is 
multiplied by the specific tariff applicable for that particular class, with the product 
being the tariff revenue realized by the United States Treasury Department for that class 
of alkali. Second, the Treasury Department’s tariff revenues for each of the various 
classes of alkali are added together, with the sum being the aggregate tariff revenue 
realized by the Treasury Department for the collective basket of alkali imports from 
Britain. Finally, dividing the Treasury Department’s aggregate tariff revenue by the 
total value of alkali imports from Britain yields annual estimates of the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff.  
British alkali exports to the United States—alternatively, American alkali 
imports from Britain—are recorded in the Trade of the United Kingdom, and likewise in 
the United States Treasury Department’s Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the 
United States. Unless otherwise noted, this study relies upon the American trade 
statistics on alkali imports from Britain, and for good reason.26 The main problem with 
the British trade statistics on alkali exports to the United States is that the Trade of the 
United Kingdom only begins disaggregating alkali into its constituent classes in 1901, 
                                                 
26 United States, Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, various years). 
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whereas the Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States records individual 
classes of alkali for the entire period from 1879/80 to 1904/05.27 Another reason, albeit 
obvious, to rely on the American trade statistics is the greater congruence between the 
classes of alkali recorded therein and the classes of alkali enumerated in the tariff 
legislation. Nevertheless, there is a drawback to using the American data; it does not 
correspond with the calendar year, but rather with the American fiscal year, which ran 
from July 1 to June 30. Consequently, the American and British data are 
desynchronized by a half-year, since the latter align with the calendar year. 
Comparisons between American and British trade statistics, when necessary, are 
complicated by this unavoidable half-year lag. 
Soda ash and caustic soda, the two classes of alkali that composed the bulk of 
imports, are the only two classes to receive consistently separate treatment in the 
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for every year between 1879/80 
and 1904/05. Bicarbonate soda loses its separate listing after 1891/92, by which time 
annual American imports of bicarbonate soda from Britain amounted to a paltry 3.4 
million pounds, or 0.8 percent of total alkali imports from Britain by both volume and 
value.28 During the mid-nineteenth century, there developed in the United States a 
nascent alkali industry, which was especially successful at manufacturing bicarbonate 
soda.29 Thus, American imports of bicarbonate soda diminished steadily throughout the 
1870s and 1880s. What little bicarbonate soda the United States imported from Britain 
after 1891/92 is relegated, within the American trade statistics, to a single category 
designated for “all other salts of soda,” an ambiguous category which this study soon 
                                                 
27 Trade of the United Kingdom (1901).  
28 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1892). 
29 For a brief discussion of early American bicarbonate soda production, see William 
Haynes, American Chemical Industry, vol. 1 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1954), 
286-287. 
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addresses. In estimating the ad valorem equivalent tariff, the calculations include 
bicarbonate soda for the years between 1879/80 and 1891/92, but not thereafter. 
Another class of alkali, sal soda, requires some clarification. Prior to 1892/93, 
the American trade statistics account for sal soda under the category of soda ash, which 
was by far the largest class of alkali imported into the United States from Britain. 
Beginning in 1892/93, however, the American trade statistics create a separate listing 
for sal soda, which constituted a substantial 5.4 percent of total alkali imports from 
Britain in that year.30 Fortunately, the inclusion of sal soda under the category of soda 
ash prior to 1892/93 does not pose a challenge for estimating the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff because the Tariff Act of 1875, the Mongrel Tariff, and the McKinley Tariff all 
imposed the same specific tariff upon both soda ash and sal soda: 0.25¢ per pound.31 In 
1894, only after the creation of a separate category for sal soda, the Wilson-Gorman 
Tariff reduced the tariff on sal soda to 0.125¢, while retaining the 0.25¢ tariff on soda 
ash.32 By the late 1890s and early 1900s, though imports of sal soda had declined, sal 
soda’s share in the collective basket of alkali imports had more than doubled, peaking at 
11.8 percent of total American alkali imports from Britain in 1903/04.33 In sum, the 
calculations for estimating the ad valorem equivalent tariff fully account for this 
increasingly significant class of alkali, and are not at all complicated by its inclusion 
under the category of soda ash before 1892/93. 
In estimating the ad valorem equivalent tariff, soda crystals present the greatest 
difficulty. The Tariff Act of 1875, Mongrel Tariff, McKinley Tariff, Wilson-Gorman 
Tariff, and Dingley Tariff all enumerated a specific tariff for soda crystals. Yet, the 
American trade statistics do not include a separate category for soda crystals, which are 
                                                 
30 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1893). 
31 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 321, 373. 
32 Ibid., 469. 
33 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1904). 
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presumably incorporated into the category of “all other salts of soda.” What portion of 
this category is composed of soda crystals? The British trade statistics offer clues. In 
1901, the first year for which the Trade of the United Kingdom disaggregates alkali into 
its constituent classes, Britain exported 4.8 million pounds of soda crystals to the United 
States.34 In 1900/01, the American trade statistics note that “all other salts of soda” 
imported from Britain amounted to 10.2 million pounds.35 Thus, approximately one half 
of the “other” category was composed of soda crystals in 1900/01. 
In Chemical Foundations: The Alkali Industry in Britain to 1926 (1980), 
Kenneth Warren provides figures on the British export of soda crystals to the United 
States, which he claims were 20.0 million pounds in 1896.36 This grossly overstated 
figure far exceeds the 8.7 million pounds of “other” alkali that the Foreign Commerce 
and Navigation of the United States records as having been imported from Britain in 
1895/96.37 Warren’s source for this figure is an anonymous article published in The 
Times on November 26, 1906. The article was an installment in an unmistakably biased 
series that championed the Leblanc process for manufacturing alkali and, at the same 
time, identified the “crushing weight of hostile tariffs” as instigating the decline of the 
Leblanc process.38 Accordingly, the anonymous author of the article was likely inclined 
to exaggerate British exports of soda crystals to the United States on the eve of the 
Dingley Tariff and, in so doing, accentuate the adverse impact of this act.  
Due to the unreliability to Warren’s source, this study defers to the fragmentary 
evidence yielded by the British trade statistics and assumes that, for every year between 
1879/80 and 1904/05, soda crystals comprise one half of “other” alkali. Therefore, in 
                                                 
34 Trade of the United Kingdom (1901). 
35 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1901). 
36 Kenneth Warren, Chemical Foundations: The Alkali Industry in Britain to 1926 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 192. 
37 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1896). 
38 The series was later published as a book, The Struggle for Supremacy (Liverpool: 
N.p., 1907), 64. 
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estimating the ad valorem equivalent tariff, one half of “other” alkali is multiplied by 
the duty on soda crystals, so as to obtain the Treasury Department’s tariff revenue for 
soda crystals. For this particular class of alkali, one further assumption is necessary. 
Prior to the Dingley Tariff, the United States imposed a single specific tariff on soda 
crystals. However, the Dingley Tariff departed from previous tariff legislation by 
differentiating between concentrated and non-concentrated soda crystals, setting the 
tariffs at 0.3¢ per pound of the former and 0.2¢ per pound of the latter.39 Lacking any 
record of the ratio of concentrated to non-concentrated soda crystals imported by the 
United States, this study presupposes that the Dingley Tariff imposed a duty on soda 
crystals equal to the average of the duties on concentrated and non-concentrated soda 
crystals: 0.25¢ per pound. 
The category of “other” alkali ranged from 0.1 percent of total American alkali 
imports from Britain in 1880/81 to 22.6 percent of these imports in 1904/05.40 After 
assuming that soda crystals comprised one half of “other” alkali, there remains yet an 
additional one half of “other” alkali unaccounted for in the calculations. This additional 
one half of “other” alkali covers various miscellaneous classes of alkali, including 
bicarbonate soda beginning in 1892/93.41 Given that the additional one half of “other” 
alkali only constituted between an estimated 0.0 and 11.3 percent of total American 
alkali imports from Britain, and given the near impossibility of determining the 
volumes, however negligible, of each miscellaneous class of alkali imported, this study 
assumes that the unaccountable alkali imports were subject to the same ad valorem 
equivalent tariff that the United States imposed upon the 88.7 to 100.0 percent 
                                                 
39 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 549. 
40 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1881 and 1905). 
41 A partial list of the miscellaneous classes of alkali follows: arseniate, bichromate, 
chlorate, chromate, hypo-sulphite, monohydrate, nitrite, sesquicarbonate, silicate, sulphide, and 
sulphite of soda, as well as combinations thereof. 
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(depending on the year) of alkali imports that are accountable. In short, the 
unaccountable alkali imports are removed from the calculations. Recall that the final 
step in constructing annual estimates of the ad valorem equivalent tariff involves 
dividing the Treasury Department’s aggregate tariff revenue by the total value of alkali 
imports from Britain. The unaccountable alkali imports are excluded from the 
numerator because no tariff revenue arising from these miscellaneous alkali imports is 
ever calculated. The unaccountable alkali imports are excluded from the denominator 
by subtracting one half of the value of “other” alkali imports from the total value of 
alkali imports.42 Hence, the full equation for computing the ad valorem equivalent tariff 
can be written as 
𝑇𝑦 = ∑(𝑡𝑎,𝑦 × 𝑞𝑎,𝑦)𝑉𝑦 − 0.5𝑚𝑦 × 100 
where a contains the five accountable classes of alkali (bicarbonate soda, caustic soda, 
sal soda, soda ash, and soda crystals), and where y contains the twenty-six years 
between 1879/80 and 1904/05. T stands for the ad valorem equivalent tariff, expressed 
as a percent, that the United States imposed upon the collective basket of alkali imports 
from Britain. The variable t represents the specific tariff for each class of alkali a. The 
variable q represents the volume of each class of alkali a imported into the United 
States from Britain. V stands for the total value of alkali imported from Britain. And 
finally, the variable m represents the value of “other” alkali imported from Britain.  
Indeed, the aggregate tariff revenue realized by the Treasury Department for the 
collective basket of alkali imports from Britain is difficult to estimate, if not for the 
aforementioned reasons, then for the simple reason that the many classes and variants of 
alkali bewildered American customs officials charged with enforcing the tariff acts. 
                                                 
42 Implicitly, this action assumes that soda crystals comprised not only one half of the 
volume of “other” alkali imports, but also one half of the value of “other” alkali imports. 
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Correspondence between the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department and the 
New York Collector of Customs sheds light on this challenge. In 1888, an importing 
firm appealed the Collector of Customs’ decision to levy a duty of 1¢ per pound—the 
specific tariff for caustic soda—on a mixture of caustic soda and lime.43 The firm 
argued that the mixture was no longer caustic soda, but rather an entirely separate 
chemical not enumerated in the Mongrel Tariff. Upon appeal, the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury upheld the Collector of Customs’ decision, but without offering any 
explanation for doing so. In classifying alkali imports, the Collector of Customs entered 
murky waters perhaps better navigated by a trained chemist than a government 
functionary.44 And while misclassifications of alkali surely occurred from time to time, 
the effect of these misclassifications upon the American trade statistics and the Treasury 
Department’s tariff revenue is unascertainable.45  
A further consideration in constructing annual estimates of the ad valorem tariff 
is that the tariff acts rarely became legally effective on the first day of the American 
fiscal year, July 1. At the beginning of the period considered in this study, 1879/80 to 
1904/05, the Tariff Act of 1875 was in effect.46 The Mongrel Tariff was passed on 
March 3, 1883 and went into effect on July 1, 1883, in perfect alignment with the 
American fiscal year.47 The McKinley Tariff, however, was passed on October 1, 1890 
                                                 
43 United States, Treasury Department, Synopsis of the Decisions of the Treasury 
Department on the Construction of the Tariff, Navigation, and Other Laws, for the Year Ended 
December 31, 1888 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1889), 465-466. 
44 See also United States, Treasury Department, Synopsis of the Decisions of the 
Treasury Department on the Construction of the Tariff, Navigation, and Other Laws, for the 
Year Ended December 31, 1889 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1890), 151.  
45 G. R. Hawke considers the effect of misclassifications as negligible in “The United 
States Tariff and Industrial Protection in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Economic History 
Review 28, no. 1 (February 1975): 88. 
46 The Tariff Act of 1875 was essentially an extension of the highly protectionist Civil 
War tariff regime. See Percy Ashley, Modern Tariff History: Germany, United States, France, 
3rd ed. (London: John Murray, 1920), 190. 
47 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 321. 
 17 
and went into effect on October 6, 1890.48 Because the McKinley Tariff was effective 
for the majority of the 1890/91 fiscal year, the specific tariffs enumerated in this act are 
applied for the whole of the 1890/91 fiscal year, in the calculations for estimating the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff was passed on August 24, 1894 
and went into effect on August 28, 1894.49 Likewise, because this act was effective for 
the majority of the 1894/95 fiscal year, its specific tariffs are applied for the whole of 
the 1894/95 fiscal year. The Dingley Tariff was passed on July 24, 1897 and went into 
effect immediately, in nearly perfect alignment with the American fiscal year—an 
especially beneficial coincidence that well enables this study to isolate the impact of the  
climactic Dingley Tariff.50 Therefore, the specific tariffs enumerated in the Dingley 
Tariff are applied for the whole of the 1897/98 fiscal year. 
The annual estimates of the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States 
imposed upon alkali imports from Britain are presented in Table 1, alongside F. W. 
Taussig’s figures for the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed 
upon all dutiable goods imported from all countries, which he compiles from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. Several observations follow from a 
comparison of these two series. But for the single fiscal year of 1897/98, the American 
tariff on British alkali was consistently less than the tariff on dutiable imports in 
general, with the mean of the former being 33.44 percent and the mean of the latter 
being 46.10 percent.51 From a purely numerical standpoint, the American alkali industry  
 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 373. 
49 F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, 8th ed. (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1931), 290. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff did not become effective on August 1, 
1894, as mentioned in the text of the act, but rather on August 28, 1894. 
50 Ibid., 549. 
51 Included in the 46.10 percent are duties that the United States imposed for the 
purpose of revenue, and not for the purpose of protection. The duty on coffee represents a 
classic example. 
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received comparatively less protection than other industries.52 While the Dingley Tariff 
temporarily afforded the alkali industry the same numerical level of protection as 
American industry overall, the rising price of alkali after 1899 eroded the ad valorem 
                                                 
52 Note well, however, that a comparatively low ad valorem equivalent tariff might 
provide sufficient protection for a certain industry, while a comparatively high ad valorem 
equivalent tariff still might not provide sufficient protection for another. 
1880 27.34 43.48
1881 28.13 43.20
1882 33.20 42.66
1883 31.78 42.45
1884 28.83 41.61
1885 30.08 45.86
1886 31.96 45.55
1887 34.52 47.10
1888 37.06 45.63
1889 37.59 45.13
1890 33.20 44.41
1891 26.99 46.28
1892 24.97 48.71
1893 25.51 49.58
1894 30.92 50.06
1895 29.68 41.75
1896 30.41 40.18
1897 30.62 42.41
1898 50.45 48.80
1899 51.42 52.07
1900 44.28 49.24
1901 39.16 49.64
1902 34.52 49.78
1903 34.90 49.03
1904 30.55 48.78
1905 31.33 45.24
Year ending June 30
Alkali imports to the 
United States from Britain 
(percent)
All dutiable imports to the 
United States from all 
countries (percent)
Table 1. AD VALOREM EQUIVALENT TARIFFS, 1880-1905
Sources: For the ad valorem equivalent tariff on alkali imports into the United States 
from Britain, see text. For the ad valorem equivalent tariff on all dutiable imports into 
the United States from all countries, F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United 
States , 8th ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1931), 527-528.
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equivalent tariff; remember that the United States imposed specific tariffs on each of the 
various classes of alkali imported.53 
For the period from 1880 to 1905, the tariff on British alkali exhibits greater 
dispersion than the tariff on all dutiable goods. The coefficient of variation is 0.20 for 
the tariff on British alkali and 0.07 for the tariff on all dutiable goods. The substantial 
degree of diversification inherent to the across-the-board tariff on all dutiable goods 
produces a relatively lower coefficient of variation. In contrast, the tariff on British 
alkali depends entirely upon an idiosyncratic group of goods collectively known as 
alkali, hence the relatively higher coefficient of variation. Nonetheless, the coefficient 
of variation for the ad valorem equivalent tariff on British alkali is not particularly high, 
compared to the coefficients of variation for the ad valorem equivalent tariffs on other 
goods, such as pig iron. V. Sundararajan extracts from the Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States annual figures for the ad valorem equivalent tariff that 
the United States imposed upon pig iron imports from all countries, though 
overwhelmingly from Britain.54 Calculated for the period from 1880 to 1905, the 
coefficient of variation for the tariff on pig iron is 0.40, or twice the coefficient for the 
tariff on British alkali. Preliminary evidence suggests that the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff on British alkali did not fluctuate exceptionally much. 
 Altogether, the ad valorem equivalent tariff on British alkali was the outcome 
of three determinants: the specific tariffs enumerated in American tariff acts, the price 
of each class of alkali, and the relative share that each class of alkali held in the 
collective basket. Moreover, none of these determinants were inconsequential or minor. 
Legislative revisions of the specific tariffs occurred at four junctures between 1880 and 
                                                 
53 Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter (New York: William O. Allison, various years). 
54 V. Sundararajan, “The Impact of the Tariff on Some Selected Products of the U.S. 
Iron and Steel Industry, 1870-1914,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 4 (November 
1970): 594-595. 
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1905, with the Dingley Tariff’s increase of the duty on soda ash from 0.25¢ to 0.375¢ 
per pound representing the most aggressive and influential revision of a specific tariff 
on a class of alkali.55 As for the price of alkali, it declined throughout the 1890s and 
dropped off sharply between 1897 and 1899, only to rise again thereafter.56 The late 
1890s trough in the price of alkali inflated the ad valorem equivalent tariff for those 
years, ostensibly exaggerating the effect of the Dingley Tariff. Thus, both legislative 
revisions and diminished prices caused the tariff on British alkali to exceed 50.0 percent 
in 1897/98 and 1898/99. The decline in the price of alkali between 1897 and 1899 was 
certainly not an exogenous phenomenon; full attention is given to the matter in a later 
section of this study.   
The third determinant of the tariff on British alkali, the relative share that each 
class of alkali held in the collective basket, surely ought not be disregarded. Here, the 
main trend was the falling share of soda ash, which accelerated after the passage of the 
Dingley Tariff. Whereas the Mongrel Tariff, McKinley Tariff, and Wilson-Gorman 
Tariff left untouched the specific tariff on soda ash, the Dingley Tariff revised the duty 
upward, prompting both an absolute and proportional decrease in American imports of 
soda ash. Even still, soda ash remained the largest class of alkali imported into the 
United States from Britain for the entire period under consideration.57 The relative share 
of caustic soda increased rapidly during the three years governed by the Wilson-
Gorman Tariff, which lowered the duty on caustic soda from 1¢ to 0.5¢ per pound.58 In 
fact, between 1893/94 and 1896/97, the share of caustic soda increased from 12.3 
                                                 
55 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 549. 
56 Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter. While there were different prices for each of the 
classes of alkali, these prices tended to move in lockstep. 
57 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1905). As late as 1904/05, 
soda ash constituted an impressive 60.1 percent of the basket of alkali imports from Britain. 
58 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 469. 
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percent to 26.1 percent.59 Yet, this temporary proportional increase was reversed by the 
Dingley Tariff, which raised the duty on caustic soda from 0.5¢ to 0.75¢ per pound.60 In 
tandem with the shrinking relative shares of caustic soda and soda ash were the growing 
relative shares of sal soda and soda crystals, though American imports of all classes of 
alkali declined, in absolute volumes, following the passage of the Dingley Tariff.  
 
Tariff Policy and British Alkali Exports 
American tariff policy toward alkali—represented numerically in the annual 
estimates of the ad valorem equivalent tariff—emanated from a fiery political struggle, 
not between manufacturers and consumers, but instead between manufacturers and 
manufacturers. The few American alkali manufacturers operating in the 1880s and 
1890s sought from the United States Congress greater protection in the form of higher 
tariffs. Meanwhile, American glass, paper, and soap manufacturers, for which alkali 
was an intermediate good, vigorously resisted upward revisions of the specific tariffs on 
the various classes of alkali, believing that higher tariffs would drive up the price of 
alkali, thereby increasing their costs of production.  
 In making the case for greater protection, American alkali manufacturers cited 
higher wages in the United States than in Britain; these manufacturers argued for a tariff 
policy that would correct for the wage differential. One such alkali manufacturer was 
the Church & Dwight Company of Syracuse, New York.61 In 1896, E. Dwight Church, 
the First Vice-President of the company, wrote to the Congressional Committee on 
Ways and Means: 
All we ask or expect is that such rates of duty will be given on alkalis, alkaloids, etc., 
competing with our makes as will compensate for the difference in labor and costs of 
                                                 
59 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1894 and 1897). 
60 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 549. 
61 Both the Church & Dwight Company and the SPC were located in Syracuse, New 
York, for reasons addressed later in this study. 
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raw materials between this and competing foreign countries. And we consider it proper 
to say right here that we are subjected to most severe competition from a powerful 
combination of foreign manufacturers, who under the existing tariff rates practically 
control this market. We refer particularly to the United Alkali Works, Limited, with 
operations which include almost the entire alkali section of and contiguous to St. 
Helens, England, and also the works of Messrs. Brunner, Mond & Co., Limited, 
successors to the Murgaetroyd [sic] Ammonia, Soda, and Salt Syndicate, Limited, of 
Middlewich, England.62  
 
The wage differential between the United States and Britain was, by no means, a new 
argument put forward by the alkali manufacturers. Earlier, in 1889, William B. 
Cogswell, the General Manager and part owner of the SPC, reported to the Committee 
on Ways and Means that, if the specific tariff of 0.25¢ per pound of soda ash were 
eliminated, the SPC would reduce its wages by 15 percent.63 Evidently, Cogswell was 
convincing; in 1890, the McKinley Tariff left the duty on soda ash intact.64 
 In the United States, the glass, paper, and soap manufacturers—the chief 
purchasers of alkali—responded to the tariff in two ways. First, these manufacturers 
claimed that the tariff on alkali increased the costs of production, which the 
manufacturers were forced to pass along to consumers.65 Laying forth this argument, 
the glass, paper, and soap manufacturers beseeched Congress to revise downward the 
specific tariffs on the classes of alkali.66 Second, these industries used the tariff on 
alkali as a justification for seeking greater protection for themselves.67 Essentially, the 
                                                 
62 Committee on Ways and Means, Tariff Hearings: Hearing before the Committee on 
Ways and Means, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., 1896, 130. 
63 Committee on Ways and Means, Revision of the Tariff: Hearing before the 
Committee on Ways and Means, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889, 342. 
64 Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, 373. 
65 Though protective tariffs raised the price of manufactured goods, consumers gained 
from a consequent decline in the price of agricultural goods during this period. See Douglas A. 
Irwin, “Tariff Incidence in America’s Gilded Age,” Journal of Economic History 67, no. 3 
(September 2007): 599.  
66 Committee on Ways and Means, Tariff Hearings: Hearing before the Committee on 
Ways and Means, 53rd Cong., 1st sess., 1893, 15. 
67 Committee on Ways and Means, Revision of the Tariff: Hearing before the 
Committee on Ways and Means, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889, 15. 
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glass, paper, and soap manufacturers were petitioning Congress for compensating 
duties.68 
 To be sure, American tariff policy toward alkali was forged out of a domestic 
political debate, which occurred throughout the 1880s and 1890s, and not just during 
the immediate run-up to the Dingley Tariff. Moreover, American tariff policy toward 
alkali was both variable and consequential well before the Dingley Tariff. Toward the 
end of his letter to the Committee on Ways and Means, E. Dwight Church stated, 
The reduction of the duty in the present so-called Wilson-Gorman act on sal soda or 
soda crystals from one-fourth to one-eighth of a cent per pound has been most 
detrimental, and indeed almost ruinous, to our interests, enabling our foreign 
competitors to largely control the American market. In simple justice to ourselves, as 
well as to the interest of the public revenue, sal soda or soda crystal should be made 
dutiable at one-fourth of a cent per pound, the same as soda ash, being the rate in the 
tariff acts of 1883 and 1890. 
 The Government statistics show an increase in the importation of these 
products in the year 1895, under the present low rate of duty, of about 12,000,000 
pounds over the year 1894….69 
 
The case of the Church & Dwight Company illustrates that, just as the Dingley Tariff 
injured the British alkali industry, so too did the Wilson-Gorman Tariff injure the 
American alkali industry. Contrary to what the scholarly literature suggests, the 
Mongrel Tariff, McKinley Tariff, and especially the Wilson-Gorman Tariff were, with 
respect to alkali, significant pieces of legislation in both intention and effect. 
 Furthermore, the British alkali industry was quite sensitive to American tariff 
legislation years before the passage of the Dingley Tariff. Brunner, Mond and the UAC 
kept very much abreast of the tariff deliberations in the United States, regularly 
reporting any developments at annual shareholder meetings. In 1895, at the general 
meeting of the UAC, the Chairman of the company described how, during the previous 
                                                 
68 If Industry A produces an intermediate good for Industry B, a compensating duty 
augments the level of protection already afforded to B by the level of protection afforded to A, 
in proportion with the intermediate good’s share in the total costs of production of B. See 
Taussig, Tariff History, 196-197. 
69 Committee on Ways and Means, Tariff Hearings: Hearing before the Committee on 
Ways and Means, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., 1896, 131-132. 
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year, merely the uncertainty over the final formulation of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff 
was enough to hinder the UAC’s sales to the United States.70  
 It was imperative that the British alkali industry of the late nineteenth century 
monitor American tariff policy, since the industry relied so heavily upon exports to the 
United States. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, approximately half of Brunner’s total 
sales, let alone exports, were to the United States.71 The American market was no less 
important for the UAC. In 1887, the Leblanc firms controlled an impressive 48.5 
percent of the American market, while Brunner, Mond held 37.0 percent.72 A handful of 
American alkali manufacturers supplied the small remainder of the domestic market.73 
Interestingly, the United States received only a trickle of alkali exports from countries 
other than Britain. In Continental Europe, a rather large alkali industry grew up under 
moderately protectionist regimes.74 However, the Continental alkali firms were not 
competitive enough to gain a foothold in the American market. In 1891/92, the United 
States imported 0.4 million pounds of alkali from Belgium, 0.6 million from France, 5.3 
million from Germany, and 421.0 million from Britain.75 Indubitably, Britain controlled 
the American alkali market. 
 Thus, when the Dingley Tariff went into effect in 1897, the British alkali 
industry found itself uniquely exposed, compared to its Continental counterparts. Over 
the next two years, British alkali exports to the United States fell off precipitously. Both 
Brunner, Mond and the UAC fully acknowledged the gravity of the situation, but 
                                                 
70 CRO, DIC UA 3/7, Reports of Proceedings at General Meetings, 1891-1925. 
71 Reader, 98. 
72 Ibid. 
73 In the 1880s and 1890s, the main American alkali firms were the Church & Dwight 
Company, Mathieson Alkali Company, Michigan Alkali Company, Pennsylvania Salt 
Manufacturing Company, and SPC. 
74 Warren, 187-189. 
75 Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States (1892). 
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maintained a tinge of optimism amid the adversity posed by the Dingley Tariff. In 1898, 
John Brock, the Chairman of the UAC, addressed shareholders:  
As our trade lay very largely with the United States, [the Dingley Tariff] has of course 
for the present considerably circumscribed our business with that country, and we have 
had to carefully consider what steps we should take in order to retain it, for we certainly 
do not mean to retire from that market (hear, hear, and applause).76 
 
Ultimately, the shareholders’ applause was never vindicated, seeing as though the UAC 
failed to recapture its American market. Brunner, Mond followed a somewhat different 
course, which is lengthily detailed in the next section of this study. At any rate, both 
firms practically stopped exporting alkali to the United States by the early 1900s.77 
Suffice it to say, the workshop of the world ceased functioning as the workshop where 
the United States bought its alkali. 
 All of the foregoing textual evidence lends credence to the connection between 
American tariff policy and British alkali exports to the United States for the rough 
period from 1880 to 1905. But does such a relationship hold up to statistical scrutiny? 
The methodology for testing whether American tariff policy impacted British alkali 
exports to the United States involves a time-series regression using annual data. The 
dependent variable, the volume of American alkali imports from Britain, comes from 
the Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States, and is presented in Table 2. 
The key explanatory variable, the estimated ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United 
States imposed upon alkali imports from Britain, is taken from the previous section of 
this study (see Table 1). 
The first of two control variables is the volume of British alkali exports to 
Scandinavia. The rationale for including this unlikely control variable deserves some 
elaboration. In the late nineteenth century, the British alkali industry routinely faced the 
indictment that its international competitiveness suffered, not because of foreign tariffs,  
                                                 
76 CRO, DIC UA 3/7, Reports of Proceedings at General Meetings, 1891-1925. 
77 Warren, 192. 
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but because of technical sluggishness, exemplified by the British alkali industry’s 
retention of the comparatively inefficient Leblanc process.78 Perhaps then, the volume 
of American alkali imports from Britain was determined by the technical efficiency (or 
inefficiency) of the British alkali industry. More broadly, perhaps the volume of 
American alkali imports from Britain was determined, at least in part, by the overall 
productivity of the British alkali industry within an international context. Accordingly, 
the regression employs a control variable that captures the British alkali industry’s 
productivity. 
 In the 1880s and 1890s, there blossomed an appreciable trade between Britain 
and the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.79 Alkali was 
certainly a part of this trade. At the time, Scandinavia could just as easily have 
purchased alkali from countries other than Britain; Germany and France were net 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 185. 
79 S. B. Saul, Studies on British Overseas Trade, 1870-1914 (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1960), 107. 
1880 368.4 1893 508.3
1881 337.9 1894 317.3
1882 356.8 1895 395.5
1883 412.5 1896 337.9
1884 398.4 1897 250.3
1885 366.0 1898 134.7
1886 396.3 1899 77.1
1887 389.0 1900 108.5
1888 391.1 1901 54.9
1889 401.9 1902 42.5
1890 435.4 1903 39.1
1891 447.4 1904 31.4
1892 421.0 1905 29.3
Table 2. BRITISH ALKALI EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1905
Source: United States, Treasury Department, Bureau of Statistics, Foreign Commerce and 
Navigation of the United States  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, various years).
Year ending June 30
British alkali exports 
to the United States 
(million pounds)
Year ending June 30
British alkali exports 
to the United States 
(million pounds)
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exporters of alkali during this period.80 If the Continental alkali industry became more 
productive than the British alkali industry, owing to either greater technical efficiency 
or any number of other reasons, Scandinavia could have switched from purchasing 
British alkali to purchasing German or French alkali. The reverse holds true, as well. In 
this sense, the volume of British alkali exports to Scandinavia proxies for the relative 
productivity of the alkali industry in Britain, as compared to the alkali industry in 
Continental Europe.  
 During the late nineteenth century, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden were unique in that each of these countries admitted alkali free of 
any duty.81 The volume of British alkali exports to Scandinavia is therefore a fitting 
control variable; the series is unaffected by protective legislation. Although other 
countries admitted alkali free of duty, only industrial and industrializing countries, such 
as the Scandinavian nations, represented anything more than a negligible and sporadic 
market for alkali. To give an idea, in 1885, Britain exported fourteen times as much 
alkali, by volume, to Scandinavia than to all of British India.82 
 The volume of British alkali exports to Scandinavia is calculated by aggregating 
the volumes of British alkali exports to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, which are 
recorded in the Trade of the United Kingdom. Because this control variable comes from 
the British trade statistics, and because the dependent variable comes from the 
American trade statistics, the control variable is inescapably lagged by a half year, as 
discussed earlier.83 One further complication arises from the Trade of the United 
Kingdom disaggregating alkali into its constituent classes beginning in 1901. For certain 
                                                 
80 Warren, 187-189.  
81 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Foreign and Colonial Import Duties (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, various years). 
82 Trade of the United Kingdom (1885). 
83 Leading, as opposed to lagging, this control variable by a half year does not 
materially alter the statistical significance of any of the coefficients in the regression equation. 
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classes of alkali, British exports to each of the Scandinavian countries are not recorded 
separately, thereby precluding any reliable calculation of the total volume of British 
alkali exports to Scandinavia for the years 1901 to 1905. As a result, the time-series 
regression covers just the twenty-one years from 1879/80 to 1899/1900, with the control 
variables dating from 1880 to 1900.   
 The second control variable is the year-on-year percent change in Charles 
Feinstein’s index of total British industrial production.84 This variable controls for the 
possibility that macroeconomic movements affected the volume of American alkali 
imports from Britain.85 While any comprehensive analysis of the relationship between 
macroeconomic fluctuations and trade volumes falls outside the scope of this study, it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to employ a control variable that captures some degree of 
macroeconomic movement in the exporting country, especially given the tendency of 
firms to push exports when domestic demand ebbed. 
The results of the time-series regression are presented in Table 3. As the 
adjusted R2 indicates, the regression explains 64 percent of the variation in the volume 
of American alkali imports from Britain. Only the constant and the coefficient of the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff are statistically significant, and are so at the 1 percent level. 
This statistical finding nicely corroborates the abundance of textual evidence that  
American tariff policy determined the volume of alkali imports from Britain in the 
1880s and 1890s.  
  
 
 
                                                 
84 Charles Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 
1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), Table 51. 
85 Incidentally, it was during the late 1880s that American and British business cycles 
began to desynchronize. See Saul, 117. 
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It might be argued—and not unreasonably—that the small number of 
observations is a weakness of this regression.86 Unfortunately, only annual data are 
available for the variables. Working with this annual data, the selection of the years 
1879/80 to 1899/1900 as the time span for the regression is not arbitrary. The 
motivation for choosing this range finds articulation in the words of the economic 
historian Percy Ashley: “To the great disturbance and distress of business, and during 
the short period of fourteen years, from 1883 to 1897, there were four complete 
revisions of the tariff.”87 Thus, the time span of the regression, from 1879/80 to 
1899/1900, covers the fourteen years described by Ashley, as well as several years on 
each end, in order to account for the full transitions surrounding the Mongrel Tariff of 
                                                 
86 Of course, the critical t-value is higher, given the smaller number of observations. 
Even still, the constant and coefficient of the ad valorem equivalent tariff are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
87 Ashley, 190-191. 
-11.66 *
(-4.07)
-0.69
(-0.11)
2.08
(0.58)
-0.55
(-0.15)
686.75 *
(5.22)
n = 21
R2 = 0.71
Adjusted R2 = 0.64
Table 3. REGRESSION: BRITISH ALKALI EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES
Dependent variable: British alkali exports 
to the United States, 1880-1900
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level. The t-values are listed in parentheses.
British industrial output
Constant
Ad valorem  equivalent tariff 
Time
British alkali exports to Scandinavia
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1883 and the Dingley Tariff of 1897. The four tariff acts passed between 1883 and 1897 
arose out of a renaissance in the tariff debate, following the relatively dormant period of 
the 1870s. In some respect, the renaissance ended with the passage of the Dingley 
Tariff, which remained in effect for an astonishing twelve years until the Payne-Aldrich 
Tariff (1909). Indeed, the Mongrel Tariff, McKinley Tariff, Wilson-Gorman Tariff, and 
Dingley Tariff together form an identifiable cluster of American tariff legislation, which 
serves as a temporal undergirding of the analysis in this study.  
 The time span of 1879/80 to 1899/1900 also corresponds to the evolution of the 
American alkali industry. In the 1870s, there operated in the United States only a 
handful of alkali manufacturers, and just a single producer of soda ash: the 
Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company.88 By the early 1900s, the American alkali 
industry had greatly expanded, in terms of both the number of producers and the 
volume of production. The rise in the volume of production was nothing short of 
meteoric; whereas the whole of the United States produced 40.3 million pounds of 
alkali in 1880, the SPC alone was producing over 500 million pounds annually by the 
1900s.89 The twenty-one-year range of the regression covers the fullness of this 
transition. 
 A drawback of the regression equation is the high residual for 1896/97. The 
statistical explanation for the high residual is that American alkali imports from Britain 
registered a considerable decrease in 1896/97, the year before the enactment of the 
Dingley Tariff and its higher duties on alkali. There remains the question of why such a 
decrease occurred prior to the Dingley Tariff. The secondary source material has 
neglected this important question until now. 
                                                 
88 Haber, 148. 
 89 Edward H. Hempel, The Economics of Chemical Industries (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1939), 160; CRO, DIC BM 5/1, Statistics, 1884-1908. 
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 Turning to politics, the Dingley Tariff came on the heels of the American 
presidential election of 1896, which has been memorialized for its association with the 
national debate over the money supply, with the Democrats supporting the monetization 
of silver and the Republicans supporting adherence to the gold standard. While the 
money supply was the focal point of the election of 1896, there were other matters at 
stake, as well. The Republicans espoused a strong policy of protection, and initially 
tried to center the election on the tariff question, before the Democrats forced the issue 
of the money supply.90 When the Republicans emerged victorious from the election of 
1896, tariff reform was high on their legislative agenda, so high that the freshly 
inaugurated President McKinley called a special session of Congress for the purpose of 
drafting and passing a new tariff act.91 The Wilson-Gorman Tariff, aside from being 
insufficiently protectionist for the Republican palate, also left a shortfall in the budget 
of the United States.92 For these reasons, it was only a matter of time before Congress 
replaced the Wilson-Gorman Tariff with a highly protectionist and revenue-generating 
piece of legislation. 
 In the early months of 1897, businesses likely anticipated the Dingley Tariff, 
and the American alkali firms were no exception. Rather than wait idly for higher 
duties, American alkali manufacturers began to compete amongst themselves for the 
soon-to-be-forfeited share of the domestic market held by British firms. The minutes of 
the March 15, 1897 general meeting of the UAC provide a vivid account of the 
competition: 
                                                 
90 F. W. Taussig, “The United States Tariff Act of 1897,” Economic Journal 7, no. 28 
(December 1897): 593. The Republican campaign slogan was intended to be “Protection and 
Prosperity.” 
91 Ibid., 592. During the 51st Congress, the future President William McKinley served as 
the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of Representatives. Under his 
supervision, the Tariff Act of 1890 was crafted. Hence, the Tariff Act of 1890 became known as 
the McKinley Tariff. 
92 Taussig, Tariff History, 324-325. 
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When [the election of 1896] was decided in favour of Mr. McKinley, then immediately 
began the movement for an increase of the Tariff. All this unsettled trade; and the 
promise of increased demand for our goods fell away. This change was felt keenly by 
the American manufacturers of Sodas, and they began a severe competition with each 
other, by which prices were run down to a figure unprecedentedly low…Of course, 
while this war of prices was going on, we considered it best to stand aside to a large 
extent, and to let the domestic makers take the loss…93 
 
Therefore, via unprofitably low prices, competition amongst the American alkali 
manufacturers hastened the demise of British alkali exports to the United States many 
months before the passage of the Dingley Tariff on July 24, 1897, hence the high 
residual. The unprofitably low prices hurt not only the UAC’s exports to the United 
States, but also Brunner’s.94 Between 1895/96 and 1896/97, Brunner’s alkali exports to 
the United States declined by 26.4 percent.95 Yet, for Brunner, Mond, there was a silver 
lining: though American alkali firms were driving out British exports, Brunner, Mond 
partially owned the largest American alkali firm: the SPC.  
 Before moving on to the next section, it is necessary to digress briefly and 
clarify the composition of the British alkali industry. In the late nineteenth century, two 
major players dominated this industry: Brunner, Mond and, after 1890, the UAC. Still, 
there were other firms operating in Britain. In the late nineteenth century, the third 
largest British alkali firm was Chance & Hunt, a Leblanc manufacturer that refrained 
from joining the UAC in 1890.96 Furthermore, during the 1890s, several small alkali 
firms cropped up. One such firm, Murgatroyd & Company, was founded in 1893 and 
employed the ammonia-soda process.97 However, the firm was short-lived, having been 
bought out by Brunner, Mond in 1895.98 In bringing up the example of Murgatroyd & 
Company, this study does not intend to shift the focus unduly in the direction of smaller 
                                                 
93 CRO, DIC UA 3/7, Reports of Proceedings at General Meetings, 1891-1925. 
94 CRO, DIC BM 3/1/2, Board Minutes, 1890-1898. 
95 CRO, DIC BM 5/1, Statistics, 1884-1908. 
96 Stephen Miall, A History of the British Chemical Industry (London: Ernest Benn, 
1931), 20. 
97 Reader, 108. 
98 Ibid., 111. 
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British alkali manufacturers, but rather to point out that the British alkali industry 
encompassed large and small firms alike. 
 
Tariff Policy and Brunner, Mond 
 The SPC was incorporated in 1881 with an initial capitalization of $300,000. 
Solvay & Cie. of Belgium, the originator and licensor of the ammonia-soda process, 
contributed $100,000.99 Rowland Hazard, a Rhode Island industrialist whose family 
already made a fortune in the textile business, contributed a further $100,000; William 
B. Cogswell, a mining engineer, invested $95,000; and three other individuals 
contributed the remaining $5,000.100 The investors believed that their venture, aptly 
named the Solvay Process Company (lest anyone mistakenly assume that the firm used 
the inefficient Leblanc process!), would successfully compete against the British alkali 
firms for the American market.  
 From its very inception, the SPC seemed to have everything going for it. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the SPC was its location in Syracuse, New York, where 
salt, limestone, and water, the main inputs in the ammonia-soda process, were 
abundant.101 Salt was only recently discovered in the region in 1878.102 Hazard and 
Cogswell recognized the importance of this discovery, and were eager to capitalize 
upon it, just as soon as they obtained a license for the ammonia-soda process from 
Solvay & Cie. The SPC further availed itself of the bountiful natural resource 
endowments of the region when the firm acquired the nearby Tully salt beds in 1889.103 
This acquisition represented a degree of vertical integration that seldom existed in the 
                                                 
99 Bertrams, 48-49. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Reader, 98. 
102 Hempel, 25. 
103 Bertrams, 49. 
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British alkali industry. In Britain, the alkali manufacturers typically purchased salt from 
separate firms and, after 1888, from the Salt Union.104 In fairness, Britain hardly 
possessed inferior natural resources for the production of alkali. The British alkali 
industry of the nineteenth century flourished, in no small way, because of the rich salt 
deposits of Cheshire.105  
 Access to railways and frontage on the Erie Canal further enhanced the location 
of the SPC.106 The Church & Dwight Company, an American alkali manufacturer 
primarily engaged in the production of bicarbonate soda, was also drawn to the 
opportune location of Syracuse and built a factory there in the 1890s. The SPC gained a 
steady customer in the Church & Dwight Company; each year, the SPC sold $200,000 
worth of soda ash to the Church & Dwight Company, which the latter further refined 
into bicarbonate soda, the only major class of alkali marketed to households.107  
 Far from being guaranteed, the success of the SPC depended upon the 
vicissitudinous tariff policy of the United States remaining favorable to domestic alkali 
manufacturers. For example, in 1889, the SPC invested $400,000 in equipment for the 
production of caustic soda.108 In speaking before the Congressional Committee on 
Ways and Means later that same year, Cogswell stated, “If the tariff should be lowered 
materially on caustic soda, we should have to stop our works.”109 Though the McKinley 
Tariff of 1890 did not lower the duty on caustic soda, American tariff policy held the 
                                                 
104 Reader, 103-104. 
105 On this point, Sir Alfred Mond wrote, “In this industry, as in the case of many 
others, England had an early predominance of manufacture, which was largely due to the 
favorable conditions obtaining as regards raw materials…” G. R. Porter, The Progress of the 
Nation, New ed. (London: Methuen, 1912), 413. 
106 Haynes, 270. 
107 Church & Dwight Archive (CDA), General Ledger, 1896-1902. The Church & 
Dwight Company maintains an informal archive, which has been overlooked by scholars in 
recent decades. The author wishes to thank Mr. Jim Levine of the Church & Dwight Company 
for generously granting access to this wealth of material.  
108 Committee on Ways and Means, Revision of the Tariff: Hearing before the 
Committee on Ways and Means, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1889, 343. 
109 Ibid. 
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potential to render nearly worthless the SPC’s $400,000 investment in causticizing 
equipment. The American alkali industry was born out of significant risk-taking. 
 Brunner, Mond shouldered a portion of this risk when, in 1887, the British firm 
purchased a $200,000 minority stake in the SPC, by then capitalized at $1.2 million.110 
Brunner’s foreign portfolio investment in the SPC was surely not an arbitrary one. 
Throughout the mid 1880s, the SPC gradually encroached upon Brunner’s American 
market, with the effect of reducing the profits that Brunner, Mond derived from this 
critical region of the world. By acquiring a financial position in the SPC, Brunner, 
Mond attempted to continue profiting from the American market, albeit indirectly 
through a foreign portfolio investment. The original shareholders of the SPC were 
prepared to allow Brunner, Mond to acquire a financial position, but only on the 
condition that the SPC was guaranteed, until 1892, four-ninths of the portion of the 
American alkali market jointly supplied by the two firms.111 Thus, Brunner, Mond 
exchanged profits from exports for profits from investment. Meanwhile, the SPC gained 
market share, whilst avoiding internecine competition. 
 Brunner’s minority shareholding came with the further caveat that the British 
firm surrender its voting rights, through an irrevocable proxy, to the Hazard family.112 
In the 1880s, antitrust sentiment was building in the United States, and the stipulation 
that Brunner, Mond surrender its voting rights reflected this sentiment. The American 
investors held an irrevocable proxy for some of Solvay & Cie.’s shares too.113 
Brunner’s willingness to relinquish its voting rights was indicative of the true intention 
                                                 
110 Wilkins, 404; Bertrams, 49. 
111 Reader, 98-100. Brunner, Mond and the SPC could still expand their joint share of 
the American market, though at the expense of other American manufacturers or the British 
Leblanc manufacturers. 
112 Ibid., 100. 
113 Bertrams, 83. 
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behind this foreign portfolio investment: passively earned profits, and not active 
control.   
 Whether Brunner, Mond initially conceived of its investment in the SPC as a 
financial hedge against American tariff policy is uncertain. W. J. Reader and the author 
of this study are inclined to think so.114 However, as the 1890s wore on, Brunner, Mond 
clearly recognized how its minority shareholding in the SPC mitigated the British firm’s 
financial exposure to the American tariff on alkali. Brunner, Mond augmented its 
investment in the SPC whenever the directors of the SPC increased the authorized 
capital, which happened recurrently. In 1892, the authorized capital of the SPC was 
doubled from $1.5 to $3.0 million, and shortly thereafter increased to $4.0 million in 
1895, as recorded in the Board Minutes of Brunner, Mond.115 Recall that the SPC began 
with an initial capitalization of only $300,000. Each time that the directors of the SPC 
authorized additional capital, the current investors were permitted to increase their 
shareholdings pro rata, with one minor exception. On at least two occasions, when the 
directors of the SPC authorized the issuance of more shares, a small number of shares 
were “reserved to be sold at the discretion of the Trustees.”116 In such a way, Brunner’s 
stake in the SPC became slightly diluted. While Bertrams et al. are correct to claim that 
Brunner’s shareholding in the SPC amounted to 16.7 percent in 1887, a close inspection 
of the Board Minutes of Brunner, Mond reveals that, by 1895, the shareholding had 
fallen to 15.9 percent, with Brunner, Mond owning 6,370 of the 40,000 shares issued.117  
 Now, this study turns to quantitatively addressing the question left unanswered 
by the secondary source material: to what extent did Brunner’s minority shareholding in 
the SPC mitigate Brunner’s financial exposure to the American tariff on alkali? Put  
                                                 
114 Reader, 98. 
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another way, to what extent did Brunner, Mond, operating at the microeconomic level, 
counteract the financial effect of American tariff policy, operating at the 
macroeconomic level? In light of the disastrous impact of the Dingley Tariff on the 
British alkali industry, these questions take on an even greater meaningfulness. 
 The first step in the methodology entails determining the volume of Brunner’s 
American market, or more specifically, the volume of the American alkali market upon 
which Brunner, Mond laid claim to the profits, both directly through its exports from 
Winnington and indirectly through its partial ownership of the SPC. The volume of 
Brunner’s American alkali market is therefore calculated as the sum of a) Brunner’s 
exports to the United States and b) 16 percent of the SPC’s sales in the United States,  
1888 106.0 86.2 13.8 119.8
1889 114.4 102.7 16.4 130.8
1890 138.9 110.9 17.7 156.7
1891 137.0 122.5 19.6 156.6
1892 148.9 158.1 25.3 174.2
1893 175.1 152.4 24.4 199.5
1894 128.2 150.8 24.1 152.3
1895 158.7 190.2 30.4 189.1
1896 143.9 218.0 34.9 178.8
1897 105.9 264.2 42.3 148.2
1898 44.0 363.2 58.1 102.1
1899 21.5 469.7 75.1 96.6
1900 61.1 549.0 87.8 148.9
1901 26.3 509.1 81.4 107.7
1902 19.0 573.2 91.7 110.7
1903 17.2 635.5 101.7 118.9
1904 14.1 654.3 104.7 118.8
Source: CRO, DIC BM 5/1, Statistics , 1884-1908.
Table 4. BRUNNER'S AMERICAN ALKALI MARKET, 1888-1904
Brunner's 
American alkali 
market         
(million pounds)
Brunner's 16 
percent share of 
the SPC's alkali 
sales in the 
United States 
(million pounds)
SPC's alkali 
sales in the 
United States             
(million pounds)
Brunner's alkali 
exports to the 
United States 
(million pounds)
Year ending 
June 30
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representing the portion of the SPC’s sales of which the profits accrued to Brunner, 
Mond. This study settles on the round figure of 16 percent for Brunner’s stake in the 
SPC, since the actual share of ownership was somewhere between 15.9 and 16.7 
percent, at various points in time.118 
 Table 4 and Figure 1 present data on Brunner’s annual alkali exports to the 
United States and the SPC’s annual alkali sales in the United States. The two series are 
taken from Brunner’s Statistics, a ledger that records a plethora of data relating to the 
operations of both Brunner, Mond and the SPC; Brunner, Mond evidently exercised 
great diligence in monitoring the operations of the SPC. In the ledger, both Brunner’s 
alkali exports to the United States and the SPC’s alkali sales in the United States are 
recorded as monthly data, which enables the construction of annual series that 
harmonize with the American fiscal year, running from July 1 to June 30. Because the 
monthly data go from June 1887 to December 1904, the two constructed annual series 
                                                 
118 Because 16 percent lies toward the lower bound of the range, the selection of this 
figure is biased against the postulations of this study. 
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span just the seventeen years from 1887/88 to 1903/04. The final column of Table 4 
gives the volume of Brunner’s alkali market in the United States, as calculated by the 
author. 
 The log of the volume of Brunner’s alkali market in the United States serves as 
the dependent variable in a log-log, time-series regression. The principal explanatory 
variable is the log of the estimated ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States 
imposed upon alkali imports from Britain. The volume of British alkali exports to 
Scandinavia is dropped from this regression, and for good reason. As mentioned before, 
a reliable calculation of the total volume of British alkali exports to Scandinavia is 
unachievable after 1900, owing to the peculiarities of recording in the Trade of the 
United Kingdom. Including this control variable would reduce the already small number 
of observations in the regression from seventeen (1887/88-1903/04) to thirteen 
(1887/88-1899/1900). Hence, the variable is dropped. The year-on-year percent change 
in the index of British industrial production is retained, in levels, as a lagged control 
variable in this regression. 
 The results of the regression are presented in the first column of Table 5. As 
expected, only the constant and the coefficient of the log of the ad valorem equivalent 
tariff are statistically significant, and are so at the 1 percent level. The virtue of 
performing this regression as log-log lies in the interpretation of the coefficient of the 
log of the ad valorem equivalent tariff as the elasticity of Brunner’s alkali market in the 
United States to the American tariff on alkali. The coefficient of -0.74 indicates that, on 
average and ceteris paribus, a 1 percent increase (e.g. from 30.0 percent to 30.3, not 
from 30.0 to 31.0 percent) in the ad valorem equivalent tariff on British alkali resulted 
in a 0.74 percent decrease in the volume of Brunner’s American market. Though 
certainly not immune to American tariff policy, the volume of Brunner’s American  
 40 
 
market—again, more precisely, the volume of the American alkali market upon which 
Brunner, Mond laid claim to the profits—responded in a less than unit elastic manner. 
 The second column of Table 5 adapts the time-series regression from Table 3 to 
a log-log format, with the volume of American alkali imports from Britain and the ad 
valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed upon those alkali imports both 
now expressed as logs. This log-log, time-series regression keeps the same control 
variables as in Table 3, and covers the twenty-one years from 1879/80 to 1899/1900. As 
Table 5 shows, only the constant and the coefficient of the log of the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff are statistically significant. The coefficient of the log of the ad valorem 
equivalent tariff is -2.01, with the interpretation being that, on average and ceteris 
paribus, a 1 percent increase in the ad valorem equivalent tariff on British alkali 
resulted in a 2.01 percent decrease in the volume of American alkali imports from 
-0.74 * -2.01 *
(-3.61) (-4.62)
-0.01 0.00
(-1.28) (0.10)
0.02
(1.05)
0.00 0.01
(0.15) (0.63)
7.62 * 12.27 *
(11.23) (10.23)
n = 17 n = 21
R2 = 0.65 R2 = 0.76
Adjusted R2 = 0.57 Adjusted R2 = 0.70
Dependent variable: Brunner's 
alkali sales in the United States 
(log), 1888-1904
Notes: * indicates significance at the 1 percent level. The t-values are listed in parentheses.
Table 5. REGRESSION: BRUNNER'S AMERICAN ALKALI MARKET
British industrial output
Constant
Dependent variable: British 
alkali exports to the United 
States (log), 1880-1900
 Ad valorem equivalent 
tariff (log)
Time
British alkali exports to 
Scandinavia
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Britain. Whereas the volume of Brunner’s alkali market in the United States exhibited 
an inelastic response to the tariff on alkali, the volume of British alkali exports to the 
United States exhibited a highly elastic response to the tariff on alkali.  
 In a counterfactual exercise, assume that Brunner, Mond did not acquire a 
shareholding in the SPC. Under this scenario, the volume of Brunner’s American 
market would have been no more than the volume of Brunner’s alkali exports from 
Winnington to the United States, which likely would have exhibited a highly elastic 
response to American tariff policy on par with the highly elastic response exhibited by 
the overall British alkali industry’s exports to the United States. By making a foreign 
portfolio investment in the SPC, Brunner, Mond substantially reduced how elastically 
the volume of Brunner’s American market responded to the American tariff on alkali. 
 Instead of comparing the elasticity of Brunner’s American market with the 
elasticity of the overall British alkali industry’s exports to the United States, it might be 
tempting to compare the elasticity of Brunner’s American market with the elasticity of 
just Brunner’s alkali exports to the United States. Doing so, it might be argued, would 
provide a more accurate representation of the extent to which Brunner’s shareholding in 
the SPC reduced how elastically the volume of Brunner’s American market responded 
to the ad valorem equivalent tariff on British alkali. However, this line of reasoning 
ignores the fact that, beginning in 1887, Brunner, Mond contractually limited its exports 
to the United States as a condition of purchasing shares in the SPC. Returning to the 
counterfactual world briefly, had Brunner, Mond not acquired a minority shareholding 
in the SPC, the elasticity of Brunner’s alkali exports to the United States would have 
more closely resembled the elasticity of the overall British alkali industry’s exports to 
the United States than the elasticity of Brunner’s legally restricted alkali exports to the 
United States. Accordingly, the most fitting comparison is between the elasticity of 
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Brunner’s American market and the elasticity of total British alkali exports to the 
United States.      
 Given all of the assumptions in the analysis, as well as the slightly different time 
spans covered by the two regressions, fixating upon -0.74 and -2.01 as the exact 
elasticities to the American tariff on alkali is akin to chasing after a will-o’-the-whisp. 
Moreover, these elasticities are only averages; the point elasticities vary over the entire 
range of the ad valorem equivalent tariff that the United States imposed upon alkali 
imports from Britain. Here, the crucial observation is that, to a very considerable 
degree, Brunner, Mond reduced how elastically the volume of its alkali market in the 
United States responded to the American tariff policy toward alkali. 
 The argument originally put forward in this study is that, by acquiring a 
minority shareholding in the SPC, Brunner, Mond greatly mitigated its financial 
exposure to the American tariff on alkali. Yet, how does the elasticity of a market 
correspond to the financial exposure of a firm? Two assumptions are necessary. The 
first assumption is rather pedestrian: Brunner’s marginal revenues exceeded its marginal 
costs. As the volume of Brunner’s American market increased, so too did Brunner’s 
profits increase, ceteris paribus. The reverse would need to hold true, as well. The 
second assumption is likely to incite greater skepticism: the average profit margin on 
alkali produced by the SPC equaled the average profit margin on alkali produced by 
Brunner, Mond. In other words, from a profitability standpoint, Brunner, Mond would 
remain indifferent between the following two scenarios: a) increasing its alkali exports 
to the United States by 16.0 million pounds or b) the SPC increasing its alkali sales in 
the United States by 100.0 million pounds, with 16 percent of the profits from these 
additional sales accruing to Brunner, Mond. The results of the log-log regressions in 
Table 5 are only illustrative of Brunner, Mond mitigating its financial exposure to the  
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American tariff on alkali insofar as this British firm did not curtail its average profit 
margin per unit of alkali by expanding its overall American market to encompass an 
indirect American market via partial ownership in the SPC. Of course, had the SPC’s 
average profit margin per unit of alkali sold in the United States exceeded Brunner’s 
average profit margin per unit of alkali exported to the United States, Brunner, Mond 
would have mitigated its financial exposure to American tariff policy even more so. At 
a minimum, the task now is to prove reasonable the assumption that the average profit 
margin on alkali produced by the SPC equaled the average profit margin on alkali 
produced by Brunner, Mond. Three points follow.  
 First, Brunner, Mond and the SPC used the same process (ammonia-soda) for 
manufacturing alkali. In this respect, the two firms employed a process that was both 
technically innovative and financially rewarding, as compared to the Leblanc 
process.119 However, it was hardly a foregone conclusion that, in the early 1880s, when 
the merits of the ammonia-soda process were still being debated, there would have 
                                                 
119 For an excellent discussion of the profitability of the Leblanc and ammonia-soda 
processes, see Peter H. Lindert and Keith Trace, “Yardsticks for Victorian Entrepreneurs,” in 
Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, ed. Donald N. McCloskey (London: 
Methuen, 1971). 
Month 70% caustic soda (¢ per pound) 48% soda ash (¢ per pound)
April 1897 1.90 0.85
October 1897 1.75 0.78
April 1898 1.45 0.70
October 1898 1.40 0.65
April 1899 1.45 0.75
October 1899 1.75 0.95
April 1900 1.85 1.00
October 1900 1.80 0.90
April 1901 1.90 0.90
October 1901 1.90 0.90
Table 6. NEW YORK CITY WHOLESALE PRICES OF ALKALI, 1897-1901
Source: Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter  (New York: William O. Allison, various years).
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developed in the United States an alkali industry based upon this method of production. 
As late as 1889, the Alkali Inspector in Britain wrote the following about the 
competition between the Leblanc and ammonia-soda processes: “How long this 
precarious balance of force will be maintained must be left for the future to disclose.”120 
In any event, the SPC employed the ammonia-soda process, and the not-too-distant 
future disclosed that the SPC was on the winning side of technology—along with 
Brunner, Mond.121 Thus, between the two firms, there did not exist discrepant processes 
to drive a divergence in profitability.  
 Second, even a rudimentary comparison of the money wages in the American 
and British alkali industries is revealing.122 This author’s very preliminary findings are 
that money wages in the American alkali industry did not greatly exceed money wages 
in the British alkali industry, with the implication being that wages cut into the 
American alkali industry’s profits only marginally more than the British alkali 
industry’s profits. Church & Dwight’s Time Book records the biweekly wages of its 
non-salaried employees, including both factory and office workers.123 In the Time Book, 
the first complete biweekly interval runs from January 6, 1894 through January 19, 
1894, during which time 299 employees earned wages. The mean biweekly wage was 
$17.45, or $8.73 per week. The median biweekly wage was $16.78, or $8.39 per week. 
These figures are broadly consistent with the money wages of workers in the British 
alkali industry. In 1892, the average weekly wage at the Widnes Alkali Works, taking 
into consideration both factory and office workers there, was £1 12s., or $7.78 at the 
                                                 
120 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Annual Report on Alkali &c. Works (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1889), 12. In Britain, the Alkali Inspector was a government 
official who ensured compliance with the Alkali, &c. Works Regulation Acts of 1881 and 1892. 
121 J. H. Clapham, Machines and National Rivalries (1887-1914), vol. 3 of An 
Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 173.  
122 A more exhaustive comparison of wages in the American and British alkali 
industries is an area ripe for further research. 
123 CDA, Time Book, 1894-1895. 
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gold-standard peg of $4.86 per £1.124 To be sure, this study does not allege that wages 
in the American alkali industry equaled wages in the British alkali industry. Instead, the 
goal here is to provide evidence, even if fragmentary, that money wages in the  
American and British alkali industries were not so wildly divergent as proponents of the 
Habakkuk thesis might be inclined to believe.125 Altogether, it is highly unlikely that  
there existed a large enough wage differential between Brunner, Mond and the SPC to 
create a massive chasm between the average profit margins of these two firms. 
The third point in support of the assumption that the average profit margin on 
alkali produced by the SPC equaled the average profit margin on alkali produced by 
Brunner, Mond comes from data on the price of alkali in the years following the 
passage of the Dingley Tariff. The Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter was a weekly bulletin 
that published the New York City wholesale prices of the various classes of alkali. 
Table 6 presents the New York City wholesale prices of 70% caustic soda and 48% 
soda ash, as listed in the Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter for the first week of April and 
October of each year from 1897 to 1901. As already discussed in an earlier section of 
this study, competition amongst the American alkali manufacturers drove down the 
price of alkali on the eve of the Dingley Tariff. However, by 1901, the price of alkali 
recovered to a level more than one-third higher than its trough in late 1898.126 Although 
the SPC’s profitability was compromised by the low price of alkali, which likely caused 
the SPC’s average profit margin to fall short of Brunner’s average profit margin 
between 1897 and 1899, this episode was not sustained for long. 
                                                 
124 D. W. F. Hardie, A History of the Chemical Industry in Widnes (N.p.: Imperial 
Chemical Industries, 1950), 120. 
125 H. J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 
126 Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter. 
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 The textual evidence certainly does not refute the argument that Brunner, Mond 
substantially mitigated its financial exposure to American tariff policy by investing in 
the SPC; if nothing else, the evidence supports the argument. At the May 30, 1899 
general meeting of Brunner, Mond, Sir John Brunner boldly stated, “I can congratulate 
you, gentlemen, upon the fact that we have so soon been able to recover from the heavy 
blow under which we suffered as the result of the practical loss of the American 
trade.”127 No doubt, backing these celebratory words were dividends from the SPC, as 
well as the capital appreciation of Brunner’s shares in the SPC.128 Both before and after 
the Dingley Tariff, the UAC looked with envy upon Brunner’s foreign portfolio 
investment in the SPC.129 In a display of corporate pride, the directors of the UAC did 
not refer to Brunner’s shareholding in the SPC explicitly, but rather through thinly 
veiled references: “…we must follow the example of some of our competitors, and have 
an interest in manufacturing in the countries themselves.”130 In large part, because of 
Brunner’s foreign portfolio investment in the SPC, Brunner, Mond forged ahead, while 
the UAC slipped further and further behind. 
 To imply that Brunner’s and the UAC’s profits hinged solely on the American 
alkali market is misleading. Still, it is not coincidental that, in the aftermath of the  
Dingley Tariff, Brunner’s profits grew and the UAC’s profits remained anemic.131 
Figure 2 presents the net profits of Brunner, Mond and the UAC in the years 1895, 
1900, and 1905. That Brunner’s net profits increased between 1895 and 1900 stands as 
 
 
                                                 
127 CRO, DIC BM 3/12, Minutes of Shareholder Meetings, 1881-1929. 
128 Reader, 100. Because the SPC retained earnings, dividends alone are an inaccurate 
measure of the SPC’s profitability. 
129 CRO, DIC UA 3/7, Reports of Proceedings at General Meetings, 1891-1925. 
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a testament to the resiliency of this firm’s decision making within a dynamic 
international context. Yes, the ammonia-soda process contributed to Brunner’s success, 
but so too did the SPC. 
In the late 1890s, the UAC hoped for a revival of its American market, which 
might have actually occurred, had the United States returned to lower duties on 
alkali.132 And given the frequency of American tariff acts in the 1890s, perhaps the 
UAC was simply biding its time until the political pendulum in the United States swung 
away from protectionism. To what extent the UAC believed that the United States 
might return to lower duties on alkali is difficult to judge. Needless to say, the UAC 
probably did not suspect that the Dingley Tariff would be the longest-governing tariff 
act in American history. Regardless, the UAC’s exports to the United States ceased long 
before the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in 1909. By 1900, and certainly by 1901,  
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the common sentiment amongst the directors of the UAC was that the company had lost 
its American market irretrievably.133 The loss of the American market placed the UAC 
in a rather unenviable position at the dawn of the twentieth century. Between 1897 and 
1900, the UAC’s total annual sales of caustic soda had fallen 17.0 percent.134 And even 
worse, total annual sales of soda ash had fallen 31.2 percent.135  
In 1898, the UAC belatedly followed in the footsteps of Brunner, Mond by 
establishing the North American Chemical Company of Bay City, Michigan.136 The 
North American Chemical Company primarily manufactured potassium chlorate, a 
minor class of alkali used in the match industry.137 The UAC conceived of the North 
American Chemical Company as a vehicle for circumventing the 2¢ per pound specific 
tariff that the Dingley Tariff imposed upon potassium chlorate.138 In 1899, John Brock, 
Chairman of the UAC, touted the North American Chemical Company as “an interest in 
manufacturing in the protected country” and as “a very satisfactory investment.”139 
 In reality, the UAC’s investment in the North American Chemical Company 
represented an amateurish imitation of Brunner’s investment in the SPC. First, the UAC 
created the North American Chemical Company after the enactment of the Dingley 
Tariff and after the American alkali firms captured the share of the American market 
once held by the British alkali firms. By 1899, the dust (or ash, to make the expression 
more fitting) had already settled. Second, the North American Chemical Company was 
an expensive venture relative to the small market for potassium chlorate. The total cost 
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of constructing the plant in Bay City amounted to approximately $1.3 million.140 For 
the UAC, under constant pressure to resume its dividend payments, which it had 
suspended in 1898, financing the construction of a new and likely unprofitable plant 
was an especially untimely and imprudent decision, even if the directors of the UAC 
believed that they did right simply by emulating Brunner, Mond. W. J. Reader best 
summarizes the North American Chemical Company in claiming that it was “not 
distinguished by success.”141 
  As typified by the SPC and the North American Chemical Company, financial 
capital flowed out of Britain and into the American alkali industry. But until now, this 
study has neglected the incalculable flow of human capital from the British alkali 
industry to the American alkali industry. This topic deserves at least a few words. In the 
late nineteenth century, Britain exported to the United States the technical know-how 
for manufacturing alkali. Particularly during the 1890s, many British chemical 
engineers and process laborers traversed the Atlantic and left their imprints upon the 
nascent alkali industry in the United States. In 1892, more than twenty men associated 
with one aspect or another of the British alkali industry journeyed from Runcorn and 
Widnes, England to the remote location of Saltville, Virginia, where they oversaw the 
construction of a soda ash factory for the newly incorporated Mathieson Alkali 
Company.142 The Michigan Alkali Company, incorporated in 1894, also benefited from 
the technical expertise that Britain exported to the United States.143 John Baptiste Ford, 
the founder of the company, sought vertical integration for his already successful plate-
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glass business.144 To assist him in building a soda ash factory, Ford arranged for two 
brothers formerly employed by Brunner, Mond to travel from England to Wyandotte, 
Michigan.145 
 The designs for the North American Chemical Company’s Bay City plant were 
drawn up in England by Dr. Ferdinand Hurter, the head of the UAC’s Central Research 
Laboratory.146 Hurter himself was Swiss, but had immigrated to Britain in the 1860s to 
work for the Leblanc firm of Gaskell Deacon & Company.147 As a Swiss-born chemist 
working in Britain on the designs for a plant in the United States, Hurter exemplified 
the international flows of human capital that characterized the alkali industry of the late 
nineteenth century. In the United States, Hurter’s designs were executed by an engineer 
that the UAC sent over from Britain.148  
 The SPC, however, did not draw upon the expertise of chemical engineers and 
process laborers from Britain, but rather from Belgium and France.149 In this regard, the 
SPC stood out from the American alkali firms that came into existence during the 
1890s. The SPC’s orientation toward Continental Europe ought not come as a surprise; 
recall that the firm of Solvay & Cie. of Belgium was an initial investor in the SPC, 
whereas Brunner, Mond was not. If anything, Solvay & Cie.’s role as the main provider 
of technical know-how to the SPC reaffirms the purely financial motivations behind 
Brunner’s investment in the SPC. 
 Notwithstanding the exceptional case of the SPC, the British alkali industry 
routinely exported human capital to the United States. Obviously, such a nebulous 
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export as human capital does not appear in any of the trade statistics. Nonetheless, in a 
story about the relationship between American tariff policy and British alkali exports, 
the export of human capital deserves at least passing mention. Absent the transfer of 
technical knowledge from the British alkali industry to the American alkali industry, 
even the most protective tariff policy would likely fail to induce the manufacture of 
alkali in the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 The most suitable ending for this study is the year 1905, when three otherwise 
separate developments concurrently and collectively signaled the end of active British 
involvement in the American alkali market. First, in 1905, Brunner, Mond entirely 
ceased exporting alkali to the United States.150 Second, that same year, having long 
since held the title of the largest alkali plant in the United States, the SPC’s Syracuse 
facility became the largest alkali plant in the world.151 The third and most telling 
development was that, in approximately the year 1905, the United States attained a self-
sufficient level of alkali production.152 Indeed, the American alkali industry had entered 
into adulthood. 
 Yet, the title of this dissertation refers specifically to the British alkali industry. 
The British alkali industry of the late nineteenth century was distinguished by its 
colossal export market: the United States. In 1890, Britain exported eleven times more 
alkali to the United States than to its second largest foreign market, Russia.153 Thus, 
when the United States Congress passed a quick succession of tariff legislation that 
revised the duties on alkali, the British alkali industry found itself destabilized in no 
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small way. This study has endeavored to chronicle the complex relationship between 
American tariff policy and the British alkali industry. But more than that, this study has 
examined the relationship from macroeconomic and microeconomic vantage points. 
 The first line of inquiry, the macroeconomic, addressed the effect of American 
tariff policy on the volume of British alkali exports to the United States. After 
considering an abundance of textual evidence from both British and American sources, 
this study concludes that the vicissitudinous American tariff policy of the late 
nineteenth century impacted British alkali exports to the United States. And while the 
British alkali industry most acutely felt the Dingley Tariff, prior tariff acts were hardly 
inconsequential pieces of legislation with no bearing upon the volume of alkali that the 
United States imported from Britain. In particular, the Wilson-Gorman Tariff’s 
downward revisions of the specific tariffs on several classes of alkali prompted an 
increase in the volume of British alkali exports to the United States, much to the dismay 
of American alkali manufacturers and to the delight of the American manufacturers that 
used these classes of alkali as material inputs. Supplementing all the textual evidence, a 
time-series regression revealed that the estimated ad valorem equivalent tariff that the 
United States imposed upon alkali imports from Britain—a series constructed purposely 
for this study—is a statistically significant determinant of the volume of American 
alkali imports from Britain. 
 The second line of inquiry, the microeconomic, investigated how a single British 
alkali firm fared amid a changing American tariff policy toward alkali. This study 
concludes that Brunner, Mond substantially mitigated its financial exposure to the 
American tariff on alkali by making a foreign portfolio investment in the SPC, located 
by the tariff wall. Thus, when Congress enacted the Dingley Tariff, Brunner, Mond was 
able to evade any crippling effect upon the firm’s financial condition. This finding 
 53 
settles the uncertainty in the scholarly literature over the extent to which Brunner’s 
minority shareholding in the SPC compensated for the loss of profits from direct 
exports to the United States. As Reader and Wilkins suspected, though never quite 
proved, Brunner’s financial interest in the SPC compensated for the bulk of the lost 
profits.  
 The two findings of this study, macroeconomic and microeconomic, nicely 
coalesce. Between 1880 and 1905, American tariff policy affected British alkali exports 
to the United States. And cognizant of this interplay, one British alkali firm, Brunner, 
Mond, acted so as to render its profits less dependent upon its direct alkali exports to the 
United States. Hence, an occurrence at the macroeconomic level elicited a response at 
the microeconomic level.  
 Insofar as this study has touched upon elements of arguments put forward by 
Stephen N. Broadberry and Charles Feinstein, this study has corroborated their findings. 
In the late nineteenth century, there quickly arose in the United States an alkali industry 
that spanned several firms, thousands of employees, and many millions of dollars in 
capital. If only as a case study, the late nineteenth century development of the American 
alkali industry nicely aligns with what Broadberry describes as the United States 
devoting an increasing share of its population and resources to the manufacturing 
sector. Moreover, the late nineteenth century development of the American alkali 
industry, no doubt, conforms to Feinstein’s first proposition of there being a foreign 
industrialization. The effect of the developing American alkali industry was a decline in 
the level of British alkali exports. In this sense, the British alkali industry more than 
conformed to Feinstein’s second proposition; more than a decline in the growth rate of 
alkali exports, there was a decline in the level of alkali exports. This dissertation did not 
simply corroborate the arguments of Broadberry and Feinstein, but also subtly recast 
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them in the light of American tariff policy. It is the humble opinion of this author that 
the scholarly literature on comparative industrialization has much to gain from a better 
understanding of tariffs, which this dissertation has hopefully facilitated in some small 
measure. 
All in all, by 1905, the British alkali industry parted with its old mainstay, the 
American market. In the years after 1905, there followed a tiny trickle of British alkali 
exports to the United States—the last vestiges of a once great trade. Within the British 
alkali industry, individuals gradually came to accept the loss of the American market. 
One can detect a measure of closure in Sir Alfred Mond’s words: “Industrial countries 
of modern times naturally develop their own resources and supply themselves with 
products which they had before imported mainly from Great Britain.”154  
  
Postscript 
American tariff policy did not sound the death knell for the British alkali 
industry. In 1904, Britain still accounted for half of the global production of soda ash.155 
Moreover, the brief period from 1905 to 1913 witnessed a pronounced resurgence in 
British alkali exports; the author leaves this trend to be chronicled by a future dutiful 
scholar. For now, just a few words on British alkali exports in the period from 1905 to 
1913 must suffice. If nothing else, this postscript seeks to temper what might be the 
exaggerated impression of the reader: that the loss of the American market was 
tantamount to the loss of all foreign markets. Such was not the case. 
 While it was originally envisioned that this study would cover the span of time 
from 1880 to 1913, it became increasingly obvious to the author that a fundamental 
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shift in the orientation of British alkali exports happened several years before the First 
World War, in approximately the year 1905. Therefore, the decision was made to treat 
the period from 1905 to 1913 as separate. In just this short interval of eight years, 
annual British alkali exports to all countries increased from 528.4 to 813.9 million 
pounds.156 Driving this phenomenal growth in exports were developing markets for 
alkali in both Asia and the British Empire. 
 Once again, Brunner, Mond proved itself more forward-thinking than the UAC 
when, in 1899, Brunner, Mond sent employee Henry Glendinning to China to scout out 
opportunities for exporting more alkali to that country.157 Shortly thereafter, Brunner’s 
alkali exports to China began to skyrocket.158 Following the example of Brunner, 
Mond, the UAC cultivated its own export market in Japan. In 1910, the UAC alone 
exported 20 million pounds of alkali to this rapidly industrializing country.159  
Exports to the Empire followed a similar course. Although much of the 
scholarly emphasis has been on the growth in British alkali exports to India, the growth 
in exports to Canada was equally dramatic. Between 1905 and 1913, Canadian imports 
of British soda ash increased from 10.0 to 34.4 million pounds per annum, making for a 
compound annual growth rate of 16.8 percent.160 Insofar as the British alkali industry 
turned its head toward the Empire during the years leading up to the First World War, 
the British alkali industry was ushering in a trend that many other British industries 
would follow in the interwar period.161  
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In 1926, Brunner, Mond and the UAC, along with the British Dyestuffs 
Corporation and Nobel Industries, combined to form Imperial Chemical Industries.162 
This four-way merger represented the most significant restructuring of the British alkali 
industry since the formation of the UAC in 1890. As indicated by the name of the 
company, Imperial Chemical Industries catered to an Empire-wide market and, in this 
respect, built upon groundwork already laid by Brunner, Mond and the UAC in the 
1900s and 1910s. More recently, in 1991, Imperial Chemical Industries sold its alkali 
business to Penrice, an Australian alkali firm.163 Penrice’s British alkali business 
operated under the revived name of Brunner, Mond.164 In 2006, the Indian firm of Tata 
Chemicals purchased Brunner, Mond and, in 2011, dropped the venerable name in favor 
of Tata Chemicals Europe.165 
In 1920, the SPC merged with four other American chemical firms to create the 
giant Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation.166 Brunner, Mond simply exchanged its 
shares of the SPC for shares of the new company.167 In 1985, the Allied Chemical and 
Dye Corporation closed down the century-old Syracuse alkali plant, once the largest in 
the world.168 According to the Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, alkali could be 
produced more cheaply elsewhere.169 
 Tariffs remained a fixture of the international economic order well into the 
twentieth century. Following the Dingley Tariff, succeeding tariff acts revised the duties 
on alkali. A glimpse at the specific tariff imposed upon soda ash in the twentieth 
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century reveals that the Payne-Aldrich Tariff lowered this duty to 0.25¢ per pound, 
which was a return to the duty imposed by the Wilson-Gorman Tariff.170 The 
Underwood-Simmons Tariff (1913), a triumph for the free trade movement, completely 
removed the duty on soda ash; thus, this major class of alkali remained free of any duty 
for the duration of the First World War.171 The Fordney-McCumber Tariff (1922) 
brought back the duty of 0.25¢ per pound of soda ash, which was maintained under the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930).172 However, these revisions were mostly cosmetic 
changes made to reinforce, in spirit, movements in American tariff policy toward either 
protectionism or free trade. In the twentieth century, the specific tariffs that the United 
States imposed upon the various classes of alkali existed more in the statute books than 
in practice, since the United States no longer imported anything more than a negligible 
volume of alkali.  
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